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Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger
SAMUEL DASH*
Introduction
Nearly forty years of controversy concerning government electronic eaves-
dropping on private conversations apparently was settled last year when
the Supreme Court decided Berger v. New York' and Katz v. United States.2
The effect of these decisions locks both government electronic bugging and
wiretapping practices within the requirements of the search and seizure
provisions of the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.
Berger specifically held unconstitutional a New York statute authorizing
court-ordered electronic eavesdropping on private conversations, on the
ground that it did not require adherence to the appropriate standards or
limitations compelled by the search and seizure provisions of the fourth
amendment. The Court emphasized that the statute's outstanding omission
was its failure to maintain adequate probable cause standards for judicial
review of an eavesdropping application. The requirement of a specific
description of the conversation to be overheard was a standard particularly
found lacking.
In Katz, the Court imposed fourth amendment requirements on elec-
tronic eavesdropping, even though there the government surveillance care-
fully avoided physical intrusion into the place where the private conver-
sation occurred. The government had placed a listening device on the out-
side of a telephone booth and had monitored the one-sided telephone con-
versation of a surveilled suspect.
Although both Katz and Berger dealt with fact situations involving bug-
*B.S., Temple University, 1947; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1950; Professor of Law
and Director, Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center.
The author wishes to express appreciation to Robert J. Tyrrell, a second year law student at
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ging (the use of a concealed microphone to overhear private conversations
in a particular place), as distinguished from wiretapping (the interception
of a telephone conversation occurring between two places), both decisions
clearly are applicable to wiretapping as well. This is particularly true of
Katz, which specifically overruled Olmstead v. United States,3 the case that
began the controversy in 1928 by holding that wiretapping was not within
the purview of the fourth amendment.
The Olmstead Doctrine
In Olmstead, two troublesome issues were presented; Mr. Justice Black in
his dissent in Katz vigorously insisted that the first listed below remains con-
trolling.4 These issues are: (1) whether the specific language of the fourth
amendment limits its protection to tangible articles, and (2) whether actual
physical entry into a constitutionally protected space must be shown to
render a government search and seizure illegal. Faced with these questions
in 1928, Mr. Justice Taft, speaking for the majority in Olmstead, ruled that
the specific language of the fourth amendment applied only to material
objects subjected to government search and seizure accompanied by a
trespass.5
The majority in Olmstead ignored the argument that electronic advances
could lead to a form of search more fearsome and disruptive of privacy
than physical intrusion, for electronic search is an invisible invasion of the
room-perhaps from a distance of many miles-and the seizure of inci-
dents of privacy more precious than tangible items. Mr. Justice Brandeis,
dissenting in Olmstead, perceived this danger, and predicted that tech-
nological advances would further facilitate future invasions of privacy.
These predictions have unfortunately come true today. Brandeis noted that
when the fourth amendment was adopted, force and violence were the only
3. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (5-4 decision).
4. Katz v. United States, supra note 2, at 365-66 (dissenting opinion).
5. Olmstead v. United States, supra note 3, at 464. But see Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886), and Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), where the Court found a violation
of the fourth amendment despite a lack of trespass. In Boyd, the Court declared unconstitu-
tional a law taking allegations as admitted if certain documents were not produced, while in
Jackson it applied the fourth amendment to sealed letters intercepted in the mail. The Olm-
stead Court distinguished letters from telephone conversations since the government has a
duty to protect sealed letters in its custody. Olmstead v. United States, supra note 3, at 464.
But Mr. Justice Brandeis countered:
There is, in essence, no difference between the sealed letter and the private telephone
message .... The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater
than that involved in tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line is tapped,
the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded and all conversations
between them upon any subject ... may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of one
man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other person whom
he may call or who may call him.
Id. at 475-76 (dissenting opinion).
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available means of violating its prohibitions; for this reason, trespass was
the criterion of violation. But he urged that the interpretation of the Con-
stitution must keep pace with technology, which was making available to the
government increasingly sophisticated devices. Echoing Chief Justice Mar-
shall-"we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding" 6
-Brandeis warned that the Court must recognize the underlying rights pro-
tected by the Constitution. "To protect [the right to be let alone], every un-
justifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment."7 (Emphasis added.)
The Law of Wiretapping-A Product of Statutory Interpretation
After Olmstead, the Court did not decide another wiretapping case on a con-
stitutional basis since Congress, partially out of dissatisfaction with Olmstead,
passed the Communications Act of 1934.8 Section 605 of the Act provides in
pertinent part:
[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication [by wire or radio] and divulge or publish the ex-
istence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such
intercepted communication to any person... and no person having
received such intercepted communication ... shall divulge or pub-
lish.., any part thereof, or use the same or any information therein
contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not en-
titled thereto .... 9
In Nardone v. United States (Nardone I),10 the Court held that Section
605 prohibited wiretapping, and that "the phrase 'no person' comprehends
federal agents .... "11 It further held that the introduction at trial of wire-
tap evidence is a "divulgence" within the meaning of the statute.12 Two
years later, in Nardone 11,13 the use of wiretap evidence for "leads" was
also forbidden as "fruit of the poisonous tree."'14 Thus, both direct and de-
6. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415,422 (1819).
7. Olmstead v. United States, supra note 3, at 478 (dissenting opinion).
8. 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1-609 (1964), repealing The Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44
Stat. 1162.
9. 48 Stat. 1103, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
10. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
11. Id. at 381.
12. Id. at 882.
13. Nardone v. United States (Nardone II), 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
14. Id. at 341. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine originated in Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), a search and seizure case, where Mr.
Justice Holmes elaborated: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before
the Court but that it shall not be used at all." Id. at 892. Yet the difficult burden of show-
ing wiretapping use falls on its victim, who must work in the dark. Since carefully
[Vol. )[VII
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rivative evidence obtained by wiretapping is prohibited by Section 605,
though the section itself contains no specific exclusionary rule. 15 Section
605 was further applied to the interception of telephone conversations over
intrastate wires.16 This result followed not only from Congress' failure to
restrict the section to interstate communications, but also from the fact that
messages of interstate and intrastate character pass indiscriminately over
the same wires; a wiretapper cannot, therefore, make a distinction. The only
way to protect interstate messages from interception and divulgence is to
prohibit interception of all messages.
The first limitation upon the coverage of Section 605 appeared in Gold-
stein v. United States,'7 where the Court decided that one not a party to
the intercepted conversation had no standing to object to the use of wire-
tap information. Mr. Justice Murphy took issue with the majority's analogy
to search and seizure cases, by distinguishing the fourth amendment's pres-
ervation of personal rights from protection of certain communications
media under Section 605.18
Although Section 605 contains no express provision which would permit
wiretapping when one party to the conversation consents to this intercep-
tion, the Supreme Court, in Rathbun v. United States,19 held that listen-
ing in via an extension telephone in an adjoining room with one party's
consent was not an interception and divulgence under Section 605.20 This
executed taps usually go undetected, law enforcement officials continue using them to
obtain leads. For this reason it has been suggested that a prosecutor be required to re-
spond under oath that a wiretap was not employed. See Sullivan, Wiretapping and
Eavesdropping: A Review of the Current Law, 18 HASTINCS L.J. 59, 70 (1966).
15. Evidence procured through wiretapping by a private citizen likewise is inadmissible
under Section 605, United States v. Stephenson, 121 F. Supp. 274 (D.D.C. 1954), appeal dis-
missed, 223 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1955); but wiretap evidence can be admitted in prosecutions
for violation of Section 605, United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860, 864 (2d Cir. 1957). Further-
more, the fact that federal officials obtained identical information by wiretapping would
not destroy or taint evidence otherwise lawfully acquired, United States v. Coplon, 91
F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), for
the prosecution has "ample opportunity ... to convince the trial court that its proof had
an independent origin." Nardone v. United States (Nardone II), supra note 13, at 341.
16. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
17. 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
18. Id. at 126-27 (dissenting opinion):
To say that petitioners have no standing to object to the testimony ... because they
were not parties to the intercepted messages used to secure that testimony, is to ignore
the governing factor that controlled our decision in the second Nardone case, namely,
that to permit the use of evidence so obtained would defeat or substantially impair the
underlying policy and purpose of § 605.
Ironically, in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), handed down the same day, the
Court stated: "The protection intended and afforded by [Section 605] is of the means of
communication and not of the secrecy of the conversation." Id. at 133.
19. 355 U.S. 107 (1957), rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 925 (1958).
20. The consent must be voluntary. However, it is not involuntary if one is awaiting
sentence and hopes to receive leniency by his cooperation. See United States v. Zarkin,
1968]
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rationale was based on an assumption of risk theory.21 Although Rathbun
emphasized the use of a normal extension phone, subsequent lower court
decisions have held that consent is the important factor, regardless of the
type of device used.22 Rathbun, furthermore, was only concerned with the
act of listening, not with recording. Later cases have admitted such record-
ings into evidence where there was consent by one party to the recording.
23
Another major question is the effect of Section 605 on state wiretapping.
Despite the all-inclusive wording of the section, many states do have per-
missive wiretap legislation.24 The Supreme Court first considered this ques-
tion in 1952 in Schwartz v. Texas, 25 where it held that, although intercepted
communications would be inadmissible as evidence in a federal court, it
does not follow that such evidence is inadmissible in a state court. Relying
on Wolf v. Colorado,20 the Court emphasized that even evidence seized un-
lawfully in violation of the fourth amendment could nevertheless be ad-
mitted in a state court. The Court concluded that Congress did not intend
to impose a rule of evidence on the state courts, since rules of evidence are
250 F. Supp. 728 (D.D.C. 1966), in which the court said that the same standards which are
required to validate a consent in search and seizure should apply to the consent required
to intercept a telephone conversation.
For a discussion of what constitutes interception, see Bradley & Hogan, Wiretapping: From
Nardone to Benanti and Rathbun, 46 Gro. L.J. 418, 431-41 (1958); Comment, Electronic
Surveillance, 17 BAYLOR L. Rav. 338, 341-47 (1965).
21. Rathbun v. United States, supra note 19, at 111:
Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have
an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When
such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may
complain. Consequently, one element of Section 605, interception, has not occurred.
A contrary result would have meant that a secretary violates the statute and is subject to
the penal sanction in Section 501 when she is instructed by her boss to listen in and take
notes on a conversation.
22. See, e.g., McClure v. United States, 332 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 945 (1965) ("twin-phone" attachment connected to regular earpiece by means of a rub-
ber tube); United States ex rel. Dixon v. Pate, 330 F.2d 126 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
891 (1964) (extension telephone); United States v. Williams, 311 F.2d 721 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 812 (1963) (by amplifier of a tape recorder); Carnes v. United States, 295
F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 861 (1962) (attachment placed on earpiece
of receiver).
23. United States v. Ballou, 348 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1965); Wilson v. United States, 316
F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964); United States v. Williams, supra
note 22; Ferguson v. United States, 307 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1962), remanded on other
grounds, 375 U.S. 962 (1964).
24. For a listing of these states, see Runft, The Electronic Eavesdropping Threat to the
Right of Privacy: Can the States Help? 3 IDAHo L. Rav. 13, 57-8 (1966) (Appendix V). See also
S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS 406-21 (1959).
25. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
26. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). This decision, which held that the federal exclusionary rule did
not apply to the states, was later overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Thus,
it has been suggested that Schwartz must be considered with care as a precedent in light of
Mapp. See Runft, supra note 24, at 38.
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formulated by state power.27 Five years later, the Supreme Court, in dis-
tinguishing Schwartz, said in Benanti v. United States28 that evidence ob-
tained as the result of state wiretapping, without participation by federal
authorities, is inadmissible in a federal court since the federal court is not
obliged to abide by state rules of evidence. Benanti basically reaffirmed the
Nardone cases, but Chief Justice Warren added:
[K]eeping in mind [the] comprehensive scheme of interstate regula-
tion and the public policy underlying Section 605 as part of that
scheme, we find that Congress, setting out a prohibition in plain
terms, did not mean to allow state legislation which would contra-
dict that section and that policy.29 (Emphasis added.)
This passage can hardly mean anything other than that all state laws per-
mitting wiretapping are invalid.30 In Pugach v. Dallinger,31 however, the
defendant sought to use Benanti in petitioning a federal district court to
enjoin a state district attorney from using wiretap evidence in an impending
state proceeding. The Court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the denial of
the petition on the authority of Schwartz.3 2
27. In attempting to preserve this state power, the Schwartz Court recognized that it was
actually condoning the commission of a federal crime:
The problem under § 605 is somewhat different [than an unreasonable search in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment] because the introduction of the intercepted communica-
tions would itself be a violation of the statute, but in the absence of an expression by
Congress, this is simply an additional factor for a state to consider in formulating a
rule of evidence for use in its own courts.
Schwartz v. Texas, supra note 25, at 201.
28. 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
29. Id. at 105-06. Following the preemptive language of Benanti, Burack v. State Liquor
Authority, 160 F. Supp. 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) enjoined the introduction in a state court of
evidence obtained by wiretapping. But see United States ex rel. Graziano v. McMann,
275 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 854 (1961) (petition for habeas corpus
writ); People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 158 N.E.2d 817, 186 N.Y.S.2d 230, appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 361 U.S. 8 (1959).
30. See generally Lynch, Electronic Eavesdropping: Trespass by Device, 50 A.B.A.J. 540,
542-43 (1964); Runft, supra note 24, at 39-40. Even such a staunch advocate of law en-
forcement wiretapping as Kings County (N.Y.) District Attorney Edward Silver has ad-
mitted that Benanti made it a crime to wiretap even under a permissive state law. See
Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View, 44 MINN. L. REv.
835, 846-47 (1960).
31. 365 U.S. 458 (1961), af'g 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960).
32. The Pugach Court also relied on Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951), which
upheld a denial of an injunction sought to prevent state police from using the fruits of an
unlawful search and seizure in a state criminal prosecution. Since the violation of de-
fendant's constitutional right in Stefanelli had already taken place, however, its ra-
tionale might properly rest on the authority of Wolf that the states have the power to
formulate their own rules of evidence. But in Pugach it was the very introduction of the
evidence that constituted the federal crime, and yet the Court refused to enjoin.
Since Pugach was decided only four months after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
which overruled Wolf, two courts have held that Mapp neither read the exclusionary rule
into Section 605 violations nor overruled Schwartz. Williams v. Ball, 294 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 990 (1962); People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689,
229 N.Y.S.2d 406, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).
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Despite Section 605, federal wiretapping continued under an interpreta-
tion consistently followed by every United States Attorney General since
1941, with the exception of the present Attorney General, Ramsey Clark.
In that year, Attorney General Jackson, speaking for the Department of
Justice, advised the House Judiciary Committee that Section 605 did not
prohibit the mere act of "intercepting," but rather required both an inter-
ception and a divulgence. 83 Jackson further announced that since the De-
partment of Justice was a unity, divulgence of a wiretapped conversation
within the Department was not a "divulgence" forbidden by the statute.34
The Supreme Court has not passed on the question of whether a tap alone
violates Section 605.35 Jackson's interpretation clearly appears erroneous in
view of the clause forbidding any "use" of the intercepted message, whether
divulged or not. Furthennore, the position that inter-departmental com-
munication is not divulgence defies the plain words of the statute that "no
person" shall divulge or use the communication. 6 Such an interpretation
extends "the license to wiretap beyond the halls of the Justice Department
to the populace as a whole.
'37
Bugging
Electronic eavesdropping by bugging represents an invasion of privacy even
more dangerous than wiretapping. Fears of the "big ear" overhearing what
is being said in the bedroom, the confessional, the lawyer's office, or even the
33. Hearings on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., at 18 (1941).
34. For the Justice Department's theory of wiretapping, see Helfield, A Study on Justice
Department Policies on Wiretapping, 9 LAw. GUILD REV. 57, 61-62 (1949). Subsequent
attorney generals have readily admitted to doing some wiretapping. In 1959, Senator Thomas
Hennings, then chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, received
a letter from Attorney General William Rogers stating that federal officials do wiretap.
See Hennings, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Legislator's View, 44 MINN. L.
REv. 813, 814 n.5 (1960). Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach has stated that wiretapping
as such is not forbidden. See Katzenbach, An Approach to the Problems of Wiretapping,
32 F.R.D. 107 (1963).
35. Benanti v. United States, supra note 28, at 100 n.5 (1957); Rathbun v. United
States, supra note 19, at 108-09 n.3 (1957).
36. Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense Counsel's View, 44
MINN. L. REv. 855, 860 (1960).
37. Swire, Eavesdropping and Electronic Surveillance: An Approach for a State Legisla-
ture, 4 HARV. J. Lcis. 23, 25 (1966).
It is not surprising, in the wake of the Jackson interpretation, that state law enforce-
ment officials felt free to wiretap with impunity:
The status of state laws authorizing wiretapping is in doubt. It would seem that they
are all invalid.... But then again, no one really cares. Evidence obtained by state officers
and introduced in state courts is admissible under Schwartz v. Texas. The fact that it
is a crime does not mean that a state officer will be prosecuted for it. Certainly, the state
will not prosecute its own officer. It seems equally unlikely that -the Department of
Justice, at least so long as it continues itself to tap, will vindicate the rights of the
unfortunate tapee.
Kent, Wiretapping: Morality and Legality, 2 HoUSrON L. Rav. 285, 303-04 (1965).
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judge's chambers sometimes are well founded.38 Although carried on since
the early days of primitive microphones, bugging has become increasingly
insidious through modem electronic developments, notably the miniaturiza-
tion of radio transmitting equipment. Tiny microphones now appear dis-
guised as suit jacket buttons or as normally friendly olives in martinis.39
Unfortunately, the law has not kept pace with modern technology. No
federal statute regulates or controls the use of electronic devices. 40 Only
seven states prohibit such surreptitious surveillance, and six of these permit
court-order eavesdropping. 41 The roots of the Olmstead doctrine grew deep-
ly, and regrettably spread to the first bugging case to reach the Court. In
Goldman v. United States42 conversations overheard by federal agents by
means of a "detectaphone" in an adjoining room were admitted as evidence.
Since the federal agents were rightfully in the adjoining room, the Court
noted that no physical trespass on petitioners' premises took place, so use of
the detectaphone, in light of Olmstead, was not violative of the fourth
amendment. 43
Goldman thus extended a trespass-nontrespass distinction to electronic
eavesdropping; later cases involving the use of similar devices which re-
quired no physical penetration found no violation of the fourth amend-
38. See S. DASH, R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS 35-285 (1959) for a
detailed account of actual wiretapping and eavesdropping practices in several major cities.
39. For a discussion of the more sophisticated electronic devices, see generally S. DASH, R.
SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, id. at 330-58.
40. The Federal Communications Commission recently handed down a ruling forbidding
the use in eavesdropping of a transmitting device required to be licensed by the FCC, and
providing a sanction for its violation. See 47 C.F.R. § 2.701 (1967). Law enforcement offi-
cials acting under "lawful authority," however, are excluded from the scope of the reg-
ulation. Also excluded are wiretaps, hidden "mikes" and tape recorders, and long distance
eavesdropping devices.
41. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 653h-653j (West 1956); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 14-1 to 14-7
(1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (Supp.
1966); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.650 (1963); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 738 (McKinney 1967); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 165.540(1) (1967). Illinois does not permit court-order eavesdropping. See S. DASH,
R. SCHWARTZ & R. KNOWLTON, TiH EAVESDROPPERS 430-37 (1959) for a discussion of these
statutes.
42. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Preliminarily, the Court held that overhearing one side of a
telephone conversation was not violative of Section 605, since it was neither a "communi-
cation" nor an "interception" within the meaning of the act. Id. at 134.
43. The federal agents in Goldman originally planned to overhear conversations by means
of an apparatus installed in a small aperture in a partition wall. They obtained access to
petitioner's office at night for the installation. Thus, there actually was a trespass involved.
When the apparatus failed to work the next day, they employed the detectaphone. Yet the
Court found no fourth amendment violation, since the "antecedent" trespass did not aid
materially in the use of the detectaphone. Id. at 134-35.
Petitioners in Goldman sought to distinguish Olmstead on the ground that when one
speaks on the telephone, he intends his voice to leave the room, while they intended their
conversations to be confined within the four walls of the room. The Court thought the
distinction "too nice for practical application of the Constitutional guarantee .... " Id. at
135.
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ment.44 Nearly twenty years passed before weaknesses appeared in the Gold-
man distinction. In Silverman v. United States,45 police inserted a "spike"
microphone under a baseboard and through a crevice, extending it several
inches into the other side of a party wall. The microphone's spike made con-
tact with petitioners' heating duct, converting the entire heating system into
a sound conductor. The Court concluded that admission of the conversa-
tions overheard violated the fourth amendment, "[f]or a fair reading of the
record in this case shows that the eavesdropping was accomplished by means
of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the
petitioners. " 46 The Court stressed that the "decision here ... is based upon the
reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.... We
find no occasion to re-examine Goldman here, but we decline to go beyond
it, by even a fraction of an inch."47 The Court therefore deemphasized the
trespass requirement in favor of a "constitutionally protected area" test.
48
What the Court meant by this test was clarified somewhat in Lanza v. New
York, 49 a decision that a public jail was not such an area because it lacked
the "attributes of privacy." 50 Clinton v. Virginia5' then made the physical
44. See, e.g., United States v. Pardo-Bolland, 348 F.2d 316 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 944 (1965) (electronic listening device in an adjoining hotel room); People v. Ander-
son, 145 Cal. App. 2d 201, 302 P.2d 358 (1956) (listening device outside rear window of
defendant's house); People v. Graff, 144 Cal. App. 2d 199, 300 P.2d 837 (1956) (electronic
device attached to outside wall of defendant's apartment).
In Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966) custom agents employed a "scin-
tillator," a device sensitive to radiation, in the hallway outside defendant's apartment. De-
fendant subsequently was convicted of concealing smuggled watches which had radium-
treated dials. Defendant contended the walls of his apartment were penetrated and his
apartment searched by means of the scintillator, but the court, finding no physical penetra-
tion or trespass, sustained the use of this device. Even Katz, which overruled the Goldman
concept of a fourth amendment trespassory requirement, might not reach the Corngold
case. It is unlikely that Katz goes beyond overheard conversations.
45. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
46. Id. at 509.
47. Id. at 512. Justice Douglas, concurring in Silverman, could see no difference between
the invasion of privacy here and in Goldman. He noted: "[O]ur sole concern should be
with whether the privacy of the home was invaded." Id. at 513. Following Silver-
man, Cullins v. Wainwright, 328 F.2d 481 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964),
held that lowering a microphone into a ventilating shaft surrounded by the interior walls
of defendant's apartment, was an invasion of a constitutionally protected area and violated
fourth amendment rights of persons whose conversations were overheard.
48. Id. at 511: "In these circumstances we need not pause to consider whether or not
there was a technical trespass under the local property law relating to party walls. Inherent
Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of
tort or real property law." The Court thus reiterated what it had said a year earlier in
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1960) (search and seizure). See also Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 617 (1961).
49. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
50. Id. at 143. In a series of search and seizure cases, the Court recognized a variety of
areas as constitutionally protected. See See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (warehouse); Rios
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) (taxicab); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)
(rented apartment); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) (automobile);
United States v. Jefters, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (hotel room); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
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trespass requirements a reductio ad absurdum. Relying on Silverman, Clinton
held inadmissible conversations overheard by an amplifying device stuck in
a partition wall with a thumb tack, citing it as a physical penetration into a
constitutionally protected area; had it merely been taped to the wall, the
conversations would have been admissible under Silverman.
Well before its decisions in Berger and Katz, the Court had occasion to
review the police practice of using an informer or undercover police agent
to engage a suspect in conversation while secretly recording or transmitting
the conversation. The Court first considered this practice in On Lee v.
United States;52 there, a federal agent stationed outside petitioner's laundry
overheard incriminating conversations between petitioner and an old ac-
quaintance who was an informer for the Narcotics Bureau. The informer
carried a pocket microphone which transmitted the conversations to a re-
ceiver operated by the federal agent. On the authority of Goldman, the
Court held that this was not an unlawful search and seizure since there was
no trespass.
53
Later, in Lopez V. United States, 54 the Court restated the controlling con-
sideration. There, an Internal Revenue agent had a wire recorder in his
pocket at a meeting with petitioner to discuss a cabaret tax return. An offer
of a bribe was recorded and admitted at trial. The admission was held proper
since the petitioner should have been aware that the agent could testify to
the bribe offer in any event. The Court stated: "Once it is plain that [the
agent] could properly testify about his conversation with Lopez, the con-
stitutional claim relating to the recording of that conversation emerges in
proper perspective.... Indeed this case involves no 'eavesdropping' what-
ever in any proper sense of that term."55 (Emphasis added.)
582 (1946) (gas station); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (store); Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (business office). But an open field is not a constitution-
ally protected area. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
51. 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (per curiam).
52. 343 U.S. 747, rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 848 (1952). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissent-
ing, urged that Olmstead be overruled. Id. at 761. Also dissenting, Mr. Justice Douglas
admitted he was wrong in voting with the majority in Goldman. Id. at 762.
53. Cases subsequent to On Lee have followed it in similar factual situations, citing it
in connection with the nontrespass doctrine of Goldman. See Hunter v. United States, 339
F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Walker, 320 F.2d 472 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 934 (1963); United States v. Miller, 316 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
935 (1963), rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 989 (1964); United States v. Finazzo, 288 F.2d 175
(6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Vittoria, 284 F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1960). But see Hajdu v.
State, 189 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966), where defendant was convicted of unlawful med-
ical practice upon a detective's testimony as to conversations transmitted to him from a
sender hidden in a "front's" purse while she submitted to a medical examination. In revers-
ing, the Florida court found the introduction of his testimony violative of the fourth
amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth.
54. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
55. Id. at 438-39.
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Thus, where an informer or agent secretly records his conversation with
a suspect, an assumption of risk reasoning is employed; 56 there is an ele-
ment of choice involved which is lacking in surreptitious electronic eaves-
dropping.57 One risk a person faces in engaging in an incriminating con-
versation is that the person to whom he is speaking may turn out to be an
informer. The Court has long sustained the use of informers in criminal
investigations.58 The defendant cannot really argue an invasion of pri-
vacy-he can only complain that his trust in another had been misplaced.
In Osborn v. United States,59 the Court encountered another situation
similar to those in On Lee and Lopez. The petitioner was convicted of at-
tempting to bribe a federal juror. He had engaged an off-duty policeman
friend to offer the bribe, but the policeman had a recorder in his pocket and
his conversation with petitioner was recorded and later admitted into evi-
dence. The use of this recorder was judicially authorized by two federal
judges upon a sworn affidavit by the policeman regarding a similar con-
versation held previously with the petitioner. Rather than directly resting
its decision on Lopez, the Court based its holding on these precise circum-
stances, including the validity of the judicial authorization. However, the
Court did not in any way retreat from Lopez.0o
An analogous case, but one not involving the use of an electronic device, is
Hoffa v. United States.61 There, a government informer was successful in
56. Id. at 459. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, took issue with this point. He said, "On
Lee assumed the risk that his acquaintance would divulge their conversation; Lopez as-
sumed the same risk vis-a-vis Davis. The risk inheres in all communications which are not
in the sight of the law privileged.... But the risk which both On Lee and today's deci-
sion impose is of a different order. It is the risk that third parties, whether mechanical
auditors like the Minifon or human transcribers of mechanical transmissions as in On Lee
... may give independent evidence of any conversation." Id. at 450. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren filed a concurring opinion in Lopez, but he stated that On Lee was wrongly de-
cided. Id. at 441. He distinguished Lopez from On Lee in that here, the recording was
used to corroborate the testimony of a public servant, whereas in On Lee, it was used to
obviate the need to put a shady informer on the stand. The four dissenting justices also
voted to overrule On Lee. Thus, a majority of the Court was ready to overrule On Lee.
57. An analogous situation appears in cases arising under Section 605 of the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 regarding conversations intercepted with consent of one of the parties
to the conversation. See cases cited supra notes 19, 22, and 23. The recent ban imposed by
the Federal Communications Commission on the use of radio-transmitter microphones to
overhear conversations requires the consent of both parties to the conversation before the
regulation can be disregarded. See 47 C.F.R. § 2.701 (1967).
58. For a discussion of the constitutionality of using informers, see Comment, Eavesdrop-
ping, Informers, and the Right of Privacy: A Judicial Tightrope, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 975,
990-99 (1967).
59. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
60. See 52 CORNELL L.Q., supra note 58, at 989: "[I]nsofar as the Court in Osborn dis-
claims any intention of overruling Lopez, it appears that no warrant is necessary for the
recording or electronic transmission of a conversation, where a party to that conversation
has consented thereto."
61. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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becoming a party to the private conversations between the defendant and
others in a hotel room. The defendant argued that the infonner was in effect
a human "bug," planted by the government to overhear the conversations
of defendant and his confidants. The Court rejected this argument, empha-
sizing that the defendant invited the informer to the hotel room, knew at all
times that the informer was listening to his conversations, and took the risk
that his confidence would be betrayed. 62
The Demise of Olmstead
The first aspect of the Olmstead doctrine to be later rejected by the Court
was the requirement that the subject of a search and seizure under the fourth
amendment must be something tangible. In 1954, the Court in Irvine v. Cali-
fornia,6 3 an eavesdropping case, indicated that intangible conversations
may also be seized. A concealed microphone had been placed by state officials
successively in the hall, bedroom, and closet of petitioner's home. Since each
of these entries involved a trespass, Olmstead did not control, and the eaves-
dropping was held violative of the fourth amendment. The only objects
seized in Irvine, however, were the incriminating conversations. Although
the Court recognized that intangible words can be the subject of a search and
seizure, the evidence was not excluded because of Wolf v. Colorado. In
Silverman, the Court again implicitly recognized that the spoken word is
protected by the fourth amendment. Finally, in Wong Sun v. United States,
6 4
the Court explicitly so held, stating:
The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physi-
cal, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of
an unlawful invasion. It follows from our holding in Silverman v.
United States [Citations omitted.] that the Fourth Amendment may
protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as
against the more traditional seizure of "papers and effects."
65
The second aspect of the Olmstead rationale, the trespass requirement,
was first undermined by Silverman, and later by Clinton. The Katz case ex-
62. Id. at 302:
In the present case, however, it is evident that no interest legitimately protected by the
Fourth Amendment is involved. It is obvious that the petitioner was not relying on
the security of his hotel suite when he made the incriminating statements .... [H]e was
relying upon his misplaced confidence that [the informer] would not reveal his wrong-
doing....
Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth
Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he volun-
tarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.
The Court in Hoffa cited Lopez as authority.
63. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
64. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
65. Id. at 485.
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pressly overruled both Olmstead and Goldman, and held that trespass was
not a precondition to a violation of fourth amendment rights.66
Furthermore, Katz found the "constitutionally protected area" test of
Silverman an inadequate measure of fundamental fourth amendment rights,
for once a court found that defendant was in a constitutionally protected
area, actual intrusion into that area would still have to be proven by the
defendant. The rule may have been merely a corollary to the trespass-
nontrespass distinction. In any event, the rule proceeded on the assumption
that an individual's right of privacy could be turned on and off like a faucet
-there were some areas where a person had a right of privacy and others
where no such right existed. Just as the trespass rule depended on the loca-
tion of the device, the constitutionally protected area rule was contingent
on the location of the suspect. The Court held in Katz that the "Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."
'67
Fourth Amendment Standards and the Electronic Search
Once the Supreme Court ruled in Silverman that private conversations were
protected by fourth amendment search and seizure provisions, the unan-
swered question of whether there could be a reasonable search and seizure by
electronic eavesdropping became a compelling one. Later, in Berger and
Katz, the Court found that electronic eavesdropping constituted an unrea-
sonable search and seizure in most instances, leaving a narrow opening for
court-order eavesdropping in factual situations similar to that of the Osborn
case-or like the Katz case itself. The ability to describe specifically the con-
versations to be overheard and the fact that only a brief period of eaves-
dropping time was required highlight these factual settings.
Aside from the problem of meeting the probable cause standard of the
fourth amendment, at the time of Silverman another obstacle preventing
issuance of a warrant for eavesdropping seemed unassailable. This obstacle
was founded in the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Gouled v. United
States68 that a reasonable search and seizure could be conducted only where
the government had a paramount right to possess the objects sought in the
search, such as in the case of stolen property, the instruments of a crime, or
contraband. Under the Gouled rule, the search for mere evidence was in-
valid. Clearly, electronic eavesdropping for the purpose of overhearing and
66. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967): "We conclude that the underpinnings
of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that 'trespass'
doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.... The fact that the
electronic device employed ... did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have
no constitutional significance."
67. Id. at 851.
68. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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recording private conversations usually could serve no other purpose than
the collection of evidence and did not fit into the Gouled formula.
But recently, in Warden v. Hayden,69 the Court rejected the long standing
Gouled rule. Emphasizing that the only pertinent consideration for review-
ing a search and seizure's legality was its reasonableness under fourth amend-
ment standards, the Court dismissed as irrevelant the question of property
interests in the objects to be seized.
This left one remaining question: whether government agents could meet
the probable cause standard of the fourth amendment in seeking judicial
authorization to eavesdrop electronically on private conversations. In other
words, could a police officer seeking court permission to conduct an electronic
surveillance ever describe with the requisite particularity the conversation
he seeks to seize?
New York experimented for a considerable length of time with court-
supervised wiretapping. By constitutional amendment in 1938,70 New York
revised the search and seizure provision of its constitution to include inter-
ception by telephone communications within its purview. Then, by enabling
legislation in 1942, 71 it set out specific statutory provisions authorizing court-
order wiretapping. In 1957 this legislation was amended to include electronic
eavesdropping.
72
After the Silverman and Hayden decisions, the New York statute was ripe
for challenge. Berger v. New York78 provided the setting. Berger was con-
victed on a charge of conspiring to bribe the chairman of the New York
State Liquor Authority. An eavesdropping order was obtained from a justice
of the New York Supreme Court, as required by statute.7 4 The order per-
mitted the installation of a recording device in an attorney's office for a peri-
od of 60 days. On the basis of leads obtained from this eavesdropping, a sec-
ond order was granted permitting the installation of a device in another
office for a similar period. In this way, the conspiracy was uncovered, and
Berger was convicted after the recordings were admitted into evidence at
his trial.
The United States Supreme Court measured the New York statute and
the kinds of surveillance procedures it authorized against traditional stand.
ards of reasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment. These
standards include: (1) a showing of probable cause; (2) a description with
specificity of the object to be seized; (3) notice to the subject of the search;
69. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
70. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 12.
71. LAWS OF N.Y., ch. 924 (1942).
72. LAWs OF N.Y., ch. 879, § 1 (1957).
73. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
74. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813a (McKinney 1958).
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(4) a determined limitation on the time of the search; and (5) a return to
the magistrate specifying the items seized. The Court found that the New
York statute complied with none of these standards,7 5 emphasizing especial-
ly its failure to require police agents to describe with specificity the conver-
sation sought to be obtained. Indeed, the Court found that, with rare excep-
tions, it seemed impossible to comply with this specificity requirement, since
the conversations to be overheard would not yet have occurred at the time
of the application, and their occurrence in the future was only suspected.
Owing to the extreme difficulty in most cases of determining in advance a
conversation's content, the Court concluded that an order issued under the
circumstances would amount to nothing less than a general warrant in the
nature of a dragnet and, therefore, would be incompatible with fourth
amendment principles. 76 Yet such a conclusion, the Court noted, does not
lead to absolute exclusion:
It is said that neither a warrant nor a statute authorizing eaves-
dropping can be drawn so as to meet the Fourth Amendment's
requirements. If that be true then the "fruits" of eavesdropping
devices are barred under the Amendment. On the other hand...
[t]he Fourth Amendment does not make the "precincts of the home
or the office.., sanctuaries where the law can never reach."... [B]ut
it does prescribe a constitutional standard that must be met before
official invasion is permissible.
77
Justice Douglas, however, warned:
It is, of course, possible for a statute to provide that wiretap or
electronic eavesdrop evidence is admissible only in a prosecution for
the crime to which the showing of probable cause related .... But
such a limitation would not alter the fact that the order authorizes
a general search. Whether or not the evidence obtained is used at a
trial for another crime, the privacy of the individual has been in-
fringed by the interception of all of his conversations. And, even
though the information is not introduced as evidence, it can and
probably will be used as leads and background information.
7 8
Berger thus left the door open to reasonable searches and seizures by elec-
tronic eavesdropping, pointing to Osborn as illustrative of circumstances
where police activity complied with fourth amendment standards.
As discussed above, Osborn dealt with an informer's secret recording
of his own conversation with the petitioner. Although apparently unneces-
75. Berger v. New York, supra note 73, at 58-60.
76. Id. at 64. The use of general warrants and writs of assistance, first condemned
in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765), was outlawed by the framers in draft-
ing the fourth amendment. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886).
77. Id. at 63-4.
78. Id. at 66 (concurring opinion).
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sary under Lopez, the use of the recording device was judicially authorized
by two federal judges upon the informer's sworn affidavit. The specificity
requirement was easily met since the informer had previously discussed the
question with the petitioner. The recording was held admissible into evi-
dence, partly because the judges' authorization was supported by "a detailed
factual affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense directly
and immediately affecting the administration of justice in the federal court
... for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the
affidavit's allegations." 79 Because of these "precise and discriminate cir-
cumstances, circumstances which fully met the 'requirement of particu-
larity,' "80 the Court said: "There could hardly be a clearer example of
'"the procedure of antecedent justification before a magistrate that is cen-
tral to the Fourth Amendment"' as 'a precondition of lawful electronic
surveillance.' "81
The Osborn case, on its facts, was not the best vehicle for a close examina-
tion of the constitutionality of an eavesdropping court-order system. The
circumstances were indeed precise and discriminate. The conversation over-
heard could be described with particularity in advance. The fact that the
warrant application alleged an affront to the administration of justice, i.e.,
the attempt to bribe a federal juror, undoubtedly influenced the judges'
decision to sanction the secret recording. Yet, since one of the parties to the
conversation in Osborn had consented to its being monitored, such prior
court approval actually was unnecessary, as the Lopez case illustrates.
Osborn presents a rare fact situation, one that is atypical of police in-
vestigations. If it is to be the guideline for the type of eavesdropping cases
which will qualify for court order supervision, then the interpretation that
Berger eliminates nearly all police electronic eavesdropping is compelling.
Indeed, there seems to be no other conclusion.
Berger and Katz-A Reconciliation
This effect of Berger is unchanged by the Supreme Court's decision in
Katz, despite some public reaction expressing the view that the Court has
retreated from its strict ruling in Berger. Indeed, this reaction is supported
by the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black.8 2 In Katz, however, the
Supreme Court took the logical step that was required to complete what it
had begun in Silverman and Berger. Katz resolved the question of whether
police violated fourth amendment provisions by attaching an electronic
79. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966).
80. Id. at 329.
81. Id. at 330.
82. Katz v. United States, supra note 66, at 364.
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eavesdropping device to the outside of a telephone booth, thus permitting
them to overhear a conversation without physical entry into the area in
which the conversation was taking place. Silverman obviously preserved the
fiction of physical penetration, even though the basis of the trespass was an
absurdity. It seemed clear after Silverman that the Court would no longer
base a constitutional right upon the happenstance of a spike microphone
protruding a few inches into an area that was considered to be constitution-
ally protected. In Katz, the Court specifically abandoned any pretense of
requiring this form of trespass and held that the fourth amendment protects
persons, not places. In so ruling, the Court came full circle to a direct con-
frontation with Olmstead, and having rejected the underlying basis of that
decision, finally overruled it. At the same time, and for the same reasons, the
Court overruled Goldman.
But in applying the fourth amendment to search and seizure by electronic
eavesdropping where there was no physical trespass, the Court did not aban-
don the basic restrictions established in Berger for the issuance of a court
order authorizing such eavesdropping. Yet the Court recognized that the
notice requirement, applicable in physical search and seizure situations, was
not feasible in the secret type of surveillance carried on through electronic
eavesdropping.8
The Court therefore dispensed with the notice requirment in electronic
eavesdropping cases by specifically stating that a court order could have been
obtained under the facts of the Katz case, for the nature of the surveillance
there was strictly confined,8 4 could be described with particularity, and
was therefore consistent with the standards enunciated in Berger and Os-
born. The Court, therefore, has not retreated in the slightest from limiting
authorized electronic eavesdropping only to those situations exemplified by
the Osborn case, when the conversation to be overhead can be described
in advance with that degree of specificity which will meet the probable cause
standards of the fourth amendment.
It is interesting that the Supreme Court in Katz cited the Osborn case as
an illustration of the kind of fact situation which would justify the issuance
of a court order. As indicated earlier, there was no need for court supervi-
sion in Osborn, since it did not involve electronic eavesdropping. The
Court's reliance on Osborn perpetuates some confusion between the two
83. Id. at 358 n.22.
84. Id. at 354 n.14: "Based upon their previous visual observations of the petitioner, the
agents correctly predicted that he would use the telephone booth for several minutes at
approximately the same time each morning. The petitioner was subjected to electronic sur-
veillance only during this predetermined period. Six recordings, averaging some three min-
utes each, were obtained and admitted in evidence. They preserved the petitioner's end of
conversations concerning the placing of bets and the receipt of wagering information."
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types of cases. The probable explanation for the Court's consistent reference
to Osborn is, frankly, that it is the only available case which on its facts can
demonstrate to governmental authorities the kind of investigative situation
where the nature of the conversation was fully known in advance and could
be described to a magistrate with the specificity required by Berger.
It is important to note that both Berger and Katz dealt with bugging situ-
ations and not wiretapping. Katz reaches wiretapping by overruling Olin-
stead, but nothing in Katz authorizes wiretapping by court order, even if
this form of eavesdropping is now under the fourth amendment and even if
the conversation to be tapped can be described with specificity, for Section
605 of the Communications Act of 1934 prohibits wiretapping in both fed-
eral and state investigations. Clearly no court would find reasonable a form
of search and seizure which has been outlawed by Congress.
To avoid this problem, bills have been introduced in Congress to legalize
court-supervised wiretapping and bugging for law enforcement investigative
purposes.8 5 In addition, the American Bar Association Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice proposes to offer for acceptance by the
American Bar Association standards to achieve the same purpose. These
efforts are based on the assumption that court-supervised electronic eaves-
dropping is feasible and that Katz is an invitation to the legislators to take
this step. The narrow confines of this invitation have been discussed. As to
the feasibility of court supervision in this area, there has already been one
experiment which has been a demonstrated failure.
Since 1942, New York has had a statute authorizing court-supervised
wiretapping.86 It was this very statute which Berger struck down. But in the
many years of electronic eavesdropping in New York prior to Berger, an
opportunity was offered to evaluate the statute's effectiveness. In 1957, this
author studied New York's experience 7 and found that the greater amount
of wiretapping by New York plainclothesmen was carried on without com-
pliance with statutory requirements. Even where court orders were request-
ed, as in the case of wiretapping by investigators of the District Attorney's
85. In the 1961 congressional sessions, four separate bills authorizing wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping were introduced in the Senate: S. 1495 (the Dodd Bill), S. 1086,
S. 1822, S. 1221 (the Keating Bill), 87th Cong., 1st Sess. For a discussion of the Dodd and
Keating Bills, see Kent, Wiretapping: Morality and Legality, 2 HousTON L. R~v. 285, 314-
26 (1965). In the 1962 congressional sessions, an Administration-backed bill, S. 2813, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., was introduced, and in 1963, was reintroduced as S. 1308, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. See Hearings on Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Legislation Before a Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess., at 243 (1961-62). For a discussion on these committee hearings, see Semerjian, Propo-
sals on Wiretapping in Light of Recent Senate Hearings, 45 B.U.L. REv. 216 (1965).
86. N.Y. CODE Cram. PROC. § 813a (McKinney 1958).
87. See S. DASH, R. ScuwARTaz & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVEDROPPERs 35-119 (1959).
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office, there was no realistic court supervision; favored judges granted ap-
plications for warrants as a matter of form.
As the Supreme Court found in Berger, the applications for court orders
were vague and unspecific with regard to the conversations sought to be over-
heard. Wiretap and bugging installations frequently were left operating for
months while the investigators listened to literally thousands of conversa-
tions of many different persons-most of whom were not suspected of any
criminal activity. The courts made no effort to restrict this eavesdropping
activity. In effect, the investigators were conducting a wide-ranging, un-
limited, and judicially unsupervised search in the hope of obtaining in-
criminating statements from the suspect.
Another consequence of Katz is the overruling sub silentio of Schwartz.
Prior to Katz, evidence obtained by wiretapping was admissible in state
courts in accordance with state rules of evidence. This practice not only
condoned the commission of a federal crime; it also constituted the commis-
sion of a separate federal crime by the prosecutor, the witness, and the judge.
Now that wiretapping has been brought within the purview of the fourth
amendment, the Court's ruling in Mapp v. Ohio88 applies to exclude all evi-
dence obtained by wiretapping.
Conclusion
Katz and Berger are landmark decisions which should give comfort to a na-
tion of free people. It was highly important to place electronic eavesdrop-
ping within the coverage of the fourth amendment, for such surveillance
techniques constitute an extraordinary form of search and seizure. They are
terribly frightening probes into man's innermost thoughts as expressed in
speech. Indeed, if it were generally believed that eavesdropping practices
were widespread, there would probably be significant inhibition of speech.89
It is fitting that the Court should recognize in Berger and Katz that for
electronic eavesdropping, concededly within the fourth amendment, to be
lawful, the standard of particular and specific description of the conver-
sations to be searched for and seized must be strictly adhered to. As indicated
earlier, this probably means that such investigative techniques will rarely
be available to law enforcement officers. With the guidelines now set by the
Supreme Court, it is to be expected that law enforcement practices will be
88. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
89. Donald King has argued that electronic eavesdropping presents a prior restraint on
expressions and is therefore violative of the first amendment. King, Wire Tapping and Elec-
tronic Surveillance: A Neglected Constitutional Consideration, 66 DIcK. L. Rav. 17, 24-30
(1961). He submits "that expression becomes less free and is indirectly curtailed by the fear
of such surveillance." Id. at 25. He also suggests that electronic eavesdropping imposes a
direct restraint, since "certain expression is of a traditionally secret nature." Id. at 29.
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kept within the requirement of the fourth amendment. Otherwise, prosecu-
tions will fail and public confidence in the system of justice will be weak-
ened. In recent cases, the Solicitor General has set an example by advising
the Court that wiretapping or eavesdropping was practiced at some point
in the investigation.90
Encouragement has also come from the present administration's an-
nounced choice to enforce the law without using techniques incompatible
with a free society. In his 1967 State of the Union Address, President
Johnson said:
We should protect what Justice Brandeis called the "right most val-
ued by civilized men"-the right to privacy. We should outlaw all
wiretapping-public and private-wherever and whenever it occurs,
except when the security of this Nation itself is at stake-and only
then with the strictest governmental safeguards. And we should ex-
ercise the full reach of our Constitutional powers to outlaw elec-
tronic "bugging" and "snooping." 91
The Right to Privacy Act of 1967 would accomplish this objective.92 The
only exceptions to the bill's general prohibition of electronic eavesdropping
are those where one of the parties to the conversation consents or where the
President authorizes it for the protection of national security.
In the wake of Berger and Katz, it is likely that Congress will pass some-
thing less than the law called for by the President. It is to be predicted that
a wiretap bill will succeed in Congress which will allow for some court-
supervised electronic eavesdropping by law enforcement officers under the
formula set out in Berger and Katz. Nevertheless, this should accomplish the
President's purpose if the law is strictly enforced, since such permissive eaves-
dropping would be applicable only in the rarest of law enforcement situations.
A major question yet to be answered is to what extent the Court will
expand the narrow invitation for court-order electronic eavesdropping as
extended in Berger and Katz. The advances made by the Court in this vital
area of individual privacy have been truly significant. However, recent pub-
lic discussion and efforts in Congress indicate that the dust has not yet set-
tled; the future course of the law is not altogether clear. It is hoped that the
Court, now that it has accepted Justice Brandeis' warnings in Olmstead,
will resist any efforts to dilute its recent, long awaited decisions.
90. See O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967); Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S.
231 (1967); Markis v. United States, 387 U.S. 425 (1967); Moretti v. United States, 387 U.S.
425 (1967); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966); Schipani v. United States, 385 U.S.
372 (1966).
91. 113 CONG. REc. H. 27 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1967).
92. S. 928, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (Long Bill). This bill was added to the Safe
Streets Act by the Senate subcommittee. The Safe Streets Act has passed the House, and
was approved by the Senate subcommittee.
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